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Abstract This paper develops a supply chain network game theory framework with mul-
tiple manufacturers/producers, with multiple manufacturing plants, who own distribution
centers and distribute their products, which are distinguished by brands, to demand mar-
kets, while maximizing profits and competing noncooperatively. The manufacturers also may
avail themselves of external distribution centers for storing their products and freight service
provision. The manufacturers have capacities associated with their supply chain network
links and the external distribution centers also have capacitated storage and distribution
capacities for their links, which are shared among the manufacturers and competed for. We
utilize a special case of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium problem, known as a variational
equilibrium, in order to formulate and solve the problem. A case study on apple farmers
in Massachusetts is provided with various scenarios, including a supply chain disruption, to
illustrate the modeling and methodological framework as well as the potential benefits of
outsourcing in this sector.
Keywords: Generalized Nash Equilibrium, game theory, supply chains, capacity competi-
tion, outsourcing, variational inequalities, networks
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1. Introduction
The logistics landscape, from warehousing to distribution, underpinning supply chains is
dealing with increased competition and tightened capacity along with increasing consolida-
tion (cf. Langley Jr. (2015)) with 29% of shippers in a recent survey noting that they have
engaged with a larger number of third party logistics providers to get access to gain capacity.
For example, according to Phillips (2015), with a strong dollar and consumption in the U.S.
improving, more products are entering the U.S. and vacancy rates for industrial real estate,
consisting primarily of warehouse properties, are at historic lows. In some parts of Southern
California, where much of the country’s containerized cargo lands from Asia, industrial real
estate vacancy has stayed below 5% in 2015. In addition, shortages of warehouse workers as
well as truckers are posing further challenges and adding to the competition. 73% of shippers
noted that they increased their use of outsourced logistics services in 2015, as compared to
a figure of 68% in the previous year, with 35% of shippers indicating that they are returning
to insourcing many of their logistics activities, with this figure being higher than the 26%
reported the year previously (cf. Langley Jr. (2015)).
The new competitive landscape has affected different industrial sectors, including health-
care, automotive, and food. For example, UPS now provides various healthcare companies
with comprehensive third-party logistics services so as to improve the efficiency of their sup-
ply chains. UPS has recently built several healthcare logistics hubs in Asia and the Pacific
in order to catch up with the rapid growth in the demand for pharmaceuticals in this part
of the globe (cf. Pharmaceutical Commerce (2013)). In addition, UPS, Fedex, and DHL
are also making significant investments in healthcare logistics in the U.S. given the aging
population and also demands put on requirements for the handling and transport of pharma-
ceuticals, which can be perishable (Brennan and Golden (2015)). Another example consists
of British Petroleum (BP), Chevron Corp., Atlas Supply, and GATX. In order to focus on
their core competencies, BP and Chevron formed Atlas Supply for the supply and delivery
of auto parts to their 6, 500 service stations. Atlas decided to outsource all the logistics
to GATX, which took responsibility to run five distribution centers and maintain inventory
at each service station (Andel (1995) and Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky, and Simchi-Levi (2000)).
According to the World Economic Forum (2016), two competitors, Nestle and PepsiCo, are
sharing warehouse capabilities, in the form of storage, packing operations, and the distribu-
tion of fresh and chilled food products destined for their retail customers in Belgium and
Luxembourg.
In the consumer goods sector Inbound Logistics (2010) reported that manufacturers some-
times share truck and warehouse space where similar loads are destined for the same store
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or retailer warehouse. As a result, time and money may be saved. Shippers and carriers are
able to better justify transportation moves and costs, end customers can better allocate labor
for unloading full truckloads, and the energy, pollution, and congestion generated by trans-
portation can all be significantly reduced. For example, Kimberly-Clark Corporation has
been very innovative in sharing warehouses as well as freight service provision with multiple
different companies, including Unilever and Kellogg, in several European countries (Cooke
(2011)) with results of cost reduction and improvement in customer service.
Clearly, firms in supply chains have difficult decisions to make and must optimize within
their own supply chain network capacities and also as they compete for shared capacities
of third party logistics providers for both distribution center space as well as freight service
provision to their demand markets. In this paper, hence, we develop a competitive supply
chain network model consisting of multiple firms involved in the manufacture/production of
a similar, substitutable, product distinguished by each firm’s brand. The firms have available
to them their manufacturing plants and distribution centers, and supply the same demand
points, which can correspond to retailers. Each firm has a capacity associated with its supply
chain network economic activities of production, transportation, storage, and distribution.
In addition, the firms may avail themselves of external distribution enters, to which they
can outsource any or all of the storage of their products and also the ultimate delivery to
the demand markets. With the external distribution center storage links and freight service
provision links there are also associated capacities and the firms compete for storage and
freight service provision.
The model that we develop, because of the shared or “coupling” constraints, is a General-
ized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) model. Although the Nash (1950, 1951) equilibrium concept
of noncooperative behavior has stimulated a wide spectrum of supply chain network models,
including supply chain network equilibrium models (cf. Nagurney, Dong, and Zhang (2002),
Nagurney (2006), Qiang et al. (2013), Toyasaki, Daniele, and Wakolbinger (2014), and the
references therein), as well as models in which supply chain competition among vertically
integrated firms is captured (see, e.g., Masoumi, Yu, and Nagurney (2012), Yu and Nagurney
(2013), Nagurney, Yu, and Floden (2013, 2015)), there has been only limited development
of GNE models for supply chain networks. In Nash equilibrium problems, the strategies
of players, that is, decision-makers in the noncooperative game, affect the utility functions
of the others, but the feasible set of each player only depends on his/her strategies. In
contrast, in a Generalized Nash Equilibrium game, the strategies of decision-makers and,
hence, their feasible sets, also depend on the strategies played by the other decision-makers.
Nash equilibrium problems can be formulated as variational inequality problems (Gabay and
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Moulin (1980)) whereas Generalized Nash equilibrium problems are, typically, formulated
as quasi-variational inequality problems. The state of the art of the theory, algorithms, and
applications is more advanced for the former problems (cf. Nagurney (1999)) than for the
latter (see, e.g., Fischer, Herrich, and Schonefeld (2014)). This may be a reason for the
dearth of supply chain models formulated as GNE problems.
As noted in Nagurney, Alvarez Flores, and Soylu (2016), the Generalized Nash Equilib-
rium problem dates to Debreu (1952) and Arrow and Debreu (1954), although it was not
termed as such. Rosen (1965) provided a formal definition of a normalized Nash equilibrium,
provided qualitative properties, and proposed an algorithm. Bensoussan (1974) formulated
the GNE problem as a quasi-variational inequality. For background on the GNE problem,
we refer the interested reader to von Heusinger (2009) and the recent review by Fischer,
Herrich, and Schonefeld (2014). For possible recent approaches to solving GNE problems
based on global optimization see Aguiar e Oliveira Jr. and Petraglia (2016).
Nagurney, Alvarez Flores, and Soylu (2016) focused on post-disaster humanitarian relief
and constructed an integrated network model in which disaster relief NGOs compete for
financial funds from donors while also deriving utility from providing relief through their
supply chains to multiple points of demand. The shared constraints consisted not of capac-
ities on the links, as is the case for the model developed in this paper, but, rather, of lower
and upper bounds for relief supplies at demand points in order to ensure that needs of the
victims are met but not at the expense of material convergence and oversupply. The GNE
model was of a structure that enabled its reformulation as an optimization problem, based
on the elegant work of Li and Lin (2013), who also proposed an oligopoly model with capac-
ities and differentiated products and then solved a duopoly problem with linear underlying
demand price and cost functions. The GNE supply chain network model in this paper does
not have a structure amenable to reformulation as an optimization problem as in Li and Lin
(2013). Nevertheless, we make use of a variational equilibrium (cf. Facchinei and Kanzow
(2010), Kulkarni and Shanbhag (2012)), which is a specific kind of GNE. The variational
equilibrium allows for alternative variational inequality formulations of our supply chain
network Generalized Nash Equilibrium model with capacity competition and outsourcing.
What is notable about a variational equilibrium (see also Luna (2013)) is that the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the shared or coupling constraints associated the the external
distribution centers and subsequent freight service provision are the same for all players in
the game. This also has a nice economic and equity interpretation.
Although there are few Generalized Nash Equilibrium models for supply chain networks,
multiple GNE models have been constructed for the energy sector (see, e.g., Contreras,
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Klusch, and Krawczyk (2004), Krawczyk (2005), and the references therein). In addition,
there is very interesting recent research in service provisioning in cloud systems using Gen-
eralized Nash Equilibrium models (see Ardagna, Panicucci, and Passcantando (2013) and
Passacantando, Ardagna, and Savi (2016)). Jiang and Pang (2011) focused on network ca-
pacity competition in the airline industry using a Generalized Nash Equilibrium approach.
Ang et al. (2013) proposed a novel supply chain model with multiple suppliers and a single
manufacturer, which is a bilevel game in which suppliers’ frequencies of delivery are captured.
The authors formulated the problem as a GNE problem, provided qualitative properties, and
considered the case that can be converted and solved as a variational inequality problem.
Li and Nagurney (2017) developed a multitiered supply chain network game theory model
with suppliers, manufacturers, and demand markets and also provided metrics for perfor-
mance assessment of supply chains. They formulated the model, which includes capacities
faced by suppliers and manufacturers, as a variational inequality problem. As in Ang et
al. (2013), in this paper, we are concerned with the general mathematical structure of the
problem, possible global optimal solutions, and the uniqueness of the solution. For an excel-
lent edited volume on game theory and equilibria, which includes several chapters on supply
chain networks, see Chinchuluun et al. (2008).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the supply chain network
Generalized Nash Equilibrium model with capacity and outsourcing and also present several
special cases. We define the variational equilibrium and then present several alternative
variational inequality formulations. We also discuss some qualitative properties, in partic-
ular, we provide existence results. In Section 3, we present the algorithm, which yields,
at each iteration, closed form expressions for the product path flows of the firms as well
as the Lagrange multipliers associated with the firms’ own supply chain networks and the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the shared constraints, which are under control of the
distribution centers and subsequent freight service providers that the firms can outsource to.
In Section 4, we present a case study. We summarize our results and present our conclusions
in Section 5.
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2. The Supply Chain Network Generalized Nash Equilibrium Model with Ca-
pacity Competition and Outsourcing
We consider a finite number of I firms, with a typical firm denoted by i, who are involved
in the production, storage, and distribution of a substitutable product and who compete
noncooperatively in an oligopolistic manner. The products associated with the firms are
differentiated by their brands. Each firm is represented as a network of its economic activities
(cf. Figure 1). Each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I, owns niM manufacturing (production) facilities and
niD distribution centers. In addition, there are nOD external outsourcers available for the
warehousing and the distribution of the products. The I firms compete for and may share
space in the nOD external distribution centers, and the same holds for the subsequent freight
service provision for distribution to the nR demand markets. Here, for the sake of generality,
we refer to the bottom-tiered nodes in Figure 1 as demand markets. Of course, they may
correspond to retailers. Let G = [N,L] denote the graph consisting of the set of nodes N and
the set of links L in Figure 1. Each firm seeks to determine its optimal product quantities
that maximize its profits by using Figure 1 as a schematic.
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Figure 1: The Supply Chain Network Topology of the Oligopoly with Capacity Competition
and Outsourcing
The production links from the top-tiered nodes i; i = 1, . . . , I, representing firm i, in
Figure 1 are connected to the production nodes of firm i, which are denoted, respectively, by:
M i1, . . . ,M
i
niM
. The links from the production nodes, in turn, are connected to the distribution
center nodes of each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I, which are denoted by Di1,1, . . . , D
i
niD,1
. These links
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correspond to the in-house transportation links between the production plants and the in-
house distribution centers where the product is stored and then distributed to the demand
markets. The links joining nodes Di1,1, . . . , D
i
niD,1
with nodes Di1,2, . . . , D
i
niD,2
correspond to
the storage links. Finally, there are distribution links joining the nodes Di1,2, . . . , D
i
niD,2
for
i = 1, . . . , I with the demand market nodes: R1, . . . , RnR .
In addition, each firm has the option to exploit the external distribution centers. The links
joining the production nodes M i1, . . . ,M
i
niM
; i = 1, . . . , I, with the external distribution cen-
tersOD1,1, . . . , ODnOD,1 are transportation links. The links joining nodesOD1,1, . . . , ODnOD,1
with nodes OD1,2, . . . , ODnOD,2 correspond to the shared storage links that the firms com-
pete for space at. The distribution links from the nodes OD1,2, . . . , ODnOD,2 are connected
to the demand market nodes: R1, . . . , RnR ; these links may also be shared by the firms and
they correspond to freight service provision. Competition also takes place here since there
are capacities not only associated with the shared distribution centers but also with freight
provision. Of course, the firms also have capacities associated with their own production,
transportation, storage, and distribution links, which are not shared. We discuss the ca-
pacity constraints after we present the conservation of flow equations. We then discuss the
underlying supply chain network link total cost functions and the demand price functions.
The additional notation for the model is given in Table 1.
The following conservation of flow equations must hold for each firm i: i = 1, . . . , I:∑
p∈P ik
xip = dik, ∀k, (1)
that is, the demand for each firm’s product at each demand market must be satisfied by the
product flows from the firm to that demand market.
Moreover, the path flows must be nonnegative; that is, for each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I:
xip ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P i. (2)
Furthermore, the expression that relates the link flows of each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I, to the
path flows is given by:
f ia =
∑
p∈P
xipδap, ∀a ∈ L, (3)
where δap = 1, if link a is contained in path p, and 0, otherwise. Hence, the flow of a firm’s
product on a link is equal to the sum of that product flows on paths that contain that link.
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Table 1: Notation for the Supply Chain Model with Capacity Competition and Outsourcing
Notation Definition
Li the links comprising the supply chain network of firm i; i = 1, . . . , I,
that it owns/controls, with a total of nLi elements. These links include
firm i’s links to its manufacturing nodes; the links from manufacturing
nodes to its distribution centers, its storage links, and the links from
its distribution centers to the demand markets as well as the links from
its manufacturing nodes to the external distribution centers.
LS the links consisting of storage links associated with the external distri-
bution centers and the links associated with freight service provision
from the external distribution centers to the demand markets, with a
total of nLS elements. These links can be shared by the I firms, if
capacity allows.
L the full set of links in the supply chain network economy with L =
∪Ii=1Li ∪ LS with a total of nL elements.
P ik the set of paths in firm i’s supply chain network terminating in demand
market k; i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR.
P i the set of all nP i paths of firm i; i = 1, . . . , I.
P the set of all nP paths in the supply chain network economy.
xip; p ∈ P ik the nonnegative path flow of firm i’s product to demand market k;
i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR. We group firm i’s product path flows into
the vector xi ∈ RnPi+ . We then group all the firms’ product path flows
into the vector x ∈ RnP+ .
f ia the nonnegative flow of product i on link a, ∀a ∈ L; i = 1, . . . , I. We
group the link flows for each i into the vector f i ∈ RnLi+nLS+ . We then
group the vectors f i; i = 1 . . . , I, into the vector f ∈ R
PI
i=1 nLi+I×nLS
+ .
dik the demand for the product of firm i at demand market k; i = 1, . . . , I;
k = 1, . . . , nR. We group the {dik} elements for firm i into the vector
di ∈ RnR+ and all the demands into the vector d ∈ RI×nR+ .
uia the capacity on link a ∈ Li; i = 1, . . . , I.
ua the capacity on link a ∈ LS.
cˆia(f) the total operational cost associated with link a, ∀a ∈ L and all firms
i; i = 1, . . . , I.
ρik(d) the demand price function for the product of firm i at demand market
k; i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR.
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In addition, the link flows must satisfy the following capacity constraints. For links
corresponding to the individual firm networks Li; i = 1, . . . , I, we must have that:
f ia ≤ uia, ∀a ∈ Li. (4)
In other words, the flow on each link associated with a firm’s network cannot exceed the
capacity of that link.
Also, in the case of the links corresponding to the outsourced storage and distribution,
the following capacity constraints must be satisfied:
I∑
i=1
f ia ≤ ua, ∀a ∈ LS. (5)
Hence, as noted earlier, the links comprising LS can be shared among the firms. Since
the products are substitutable, we can expect them to be of the same size and, therefore,
constraints (5) are appropriate.
According to Table 1, the demand price function ρik; i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR, depends
not only on the firm’s demand for its product but also, in general, on the demands for the
other firms’ products. Hence, we also capture competition on the demand side. In view of
(1), we may reexpress the demand price function, ρik(d), as:
ρˆik = ρˆik(x) ≡ ρik(d), ∀i, ∀k. (6)
Also, according to Table 1, the total operational cost on link a for product i, cˆia, can depend
on the flow of the product on that link as well as on the flows of other products on that link
and on other links. The generality of the total operational link cost functions captures com-
petition for resources on the individual firms’ networks as well as on the shared component
of the supply chain network.
We assume that the link total operational cost functions and the demand price functions
are all continuously differentiable.
The utility/profit of firm i, U i; i = 1, . . . , I, is the difference between its revenue and its
total costs:
Ui =
nR∑
k=1
ρik(d)dik −
∑
a∈Li∪LS
cˆia(f), (7)
and the function is assumed to be concave.
Let Xi denote the vector of strategy variables associated with firm i; i = 1, . . . , I, where
Xi is the vector of path flows associated with firm i, that is,
Xi ≡ {{xp}|p ∈ P i} ∈ RnPi+ . (8)
9
X is then the vector of all firms’ strategies, that is, X ≡ {{Xi}|i = 1, . . . , I}.
Through the use of the conservation of flow equations (1) and (3), and the form of the total
operational link cost functions and the demand price functions, we can define Uˆi(X) ≡ Ui;
i = 1 . . . , I. We group the profits of all the firms into an I-dimensional vector Uˆ , where
Uˆ = Uˆ(X). (9)
Also, observe that, in view of the conservation of flow equations (3), we may rewrite the
individual firms’ capacity constraints (4) in terms of path flows as:∑
p∈P
xipδap ≤ uia, ∀a ∈ Li,∀i. (10)
Similarly, we may rewrite the shared capacity constraints (5) in terms of path flows such
that:
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P
xipδap ≤ ua, ∀a ∈ LS. (11)
We now define the each firm i’s individual feasible set Ki for i = 1, . . . , I, as:
Ki ≡ {xip ≥ 0,∀p ∈ P i and (10) holds}. (12)
In addition, we define the feasible set consisting of the shared constraints, S, as:
S ≡ {x|(11) holds}. (13)
In the competitive oligopolistic market framework, each firm selects its product path
flows in a noncooperative manner, seeking to maximize its own profit, until an equilibrium
is achieved, according to the definition below.
Definition 1: Supply Chain Network Generalized Nash Equilibrium with Capac-
ity Competition and Outsourcing
A path flow pattern X∗ ∈ K = ∏Ii=1Ki, X∗ ∈ S, constitutes a supply chain network
Generalized Nash Equilibrium if for each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I:
Uˆi(X
∗
i , Xˆ
∗
i ) ≥ Uˆi(Xi, Xˆ∗i ), ∀Xi ∈ Ki,∀X ∈ S, (14)
where Xˆ∗i ≡ (X∗1 , . . . , X∗i−1, X∗i+1, . . . , X∗I ).
10
Hence, an equilibrium is established if no firm can unilaterally improve its profit by
changing its product flows in the supply chain network, given the product flow decisions of
the other firms, and subject to the capacity constraints, both individual and shared/coupling
ones. We remark that both K and S are convex sets.
If there are no coupling, that is, shared, constraints in the above model, then X and X∗
in Definition 1 need only lie in the set K, and, under the assumption of concavity of the
utility functions and that they are continuously differentiable, we know that (cf. Gabay and
Moulin (1980) and Nagurney (1999)) the solution to what would then be a Nash equilibrium
problem (see Nash (1950, 1951)) would coincide with the solution of the following variational
inequality problem: determine X∗ ∈ K, such that
−
I∑
i=1
〈∇XiUˆi(X∗), Xi −X∗i 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (15)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in the corresponding Euclidean space and ∇XiUˆi(X)
denotes the gradient of Uˆi(X) with respect to Xi.
In our game theory supply chain network model, however, the strategies of the “players,”
which are the firms, affect not only the values of the others’ objective functions, which are the
profit functions, but also the strategies of the firms affect the other firms’ strategies because
of the shared constraints. These are sometimes also referred to as “coupling” constraints.
Hence, although Nash equilibrium problems can be formulated as variational inequality
problems, Generalized Nash Equilibrium problems can no longer directly be formulated as
variational inequality problems, but, instead, are formulated as quasi-variational inequalities
(see, e.g., Facchinei and Kanzow (2010)). However, it is well-known (cf. Luna (2013) and
the references therein) that quasi-variational inequality problems are much harder to solve.
A refinement of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) is what is known as a vari-
ational equilibrium and it is a specific type of GNE (see Kulkarni and Shabhang (2012)).
In particular, in a GNE defined by a variational equilibrium, the Lagrange multipliers as-
sociated with the coupling constraints are all the same. This, in a sense, has a fairness
interpretation and is reasonable from an economic standpoint. Specifically, we have the
following definition:
Definition 2: Variational Equilibrium
A strategy vector X∗ is said to be a variational equilibrium of the above Generalized Nash
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Equilibrium game if X∗ ∈ K,X∗ ∈ S is a solution of the variational inequality:
−
I∑
i=1
〈∇XiUˆi(X∗), Xi −X∗i 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, ∀X ∈ S. (16)
By utilizing a variational equilibrium, we can take advantage of the well-developed theory
of variational inequalities, including algorithms (cf. Nagurney (1999) and the references
therein), which are in a more advanced state of development and application than algorithms
for quasi-variational inequality problems.
We now expand the terms in variational inequality (16).
Specifically, by definition, we have that
−∇XiUˆi(X) =
[
−∂Uˆi
∂xip
; p ∈ P ik; k = 1, . . . , nR
]
. (17)
We also know that, in view of (1) and (7), for paths p ∈ P ik:
−∂Uˆi
∂xip
= −
∂(
∑nR
l=1 ρil(d)
∑
q∈P il x
i
q −
∑
b∈Li∪LS cˆ
i
b(f))
∂xip
. (18)
Making use of (1) and (3) and the expressions:
∂Cˆip(x)
∂xip
≡
∑
a∈Li∪LS
∑
b∈Li∪LS
∂cˆib(f)
∂f ia
δap, (19a)
∂ρˆil(x)
∂xip
≡ ∂ρil(d)
∂dik
. (19b)
we obtain:
−∂Uˆi
∂xip
=
∂Cˆip(x)
∂xip
− ρˆik(x)−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρˆil(x)
∂xip
∑
q∈P il
xiq
 . (20)
In view of (20), it is clear that variational inequality (16) is equivalent to the variational
inequality that determines the vector of equilibrium path flows x∗ ∈ K, x∗ ∈ S such that:
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
∑
p∈P ik
∂Cˆip(x∗)
∂xip
− ρˆik(x∗)−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xip
∑
q∈P il
xi∗q
× [xip − xi∗p ] ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K, ∀x ∈ S.
(21)
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Variational inequality (16) can also be expressed in terms of link flows as follows: de-
termine the vector of equilibrium link flows and the vector of demands (f ∗, d∗) ∈ K0, such
that:
I∑
i=1
∑
a∈Li∪LS
[ ∑
b∈Li∪LS
∂cˆib(f
∗)
∂f ia
]
× [f ia − f i∗a ]
+
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
[
−ρik(d∗)−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρil(d
∗)
∂dik
d∗il
]
× [dik − d∗ik] ≥ 0, ∀(f, d) ∈ K0 (22)
where K0 ≡ {(f, d)|∃x ≥ 0, (1), (3), (4), and (5) hold}.
Existence of a solution to variational inequality (21) and to variational inequality (22)
is guaranteed since each of the feasible sets is closed and bounded. Indeed, since all the
links in the supply chain network in Figure 1 have capacities imposed on them, the path
flows as well as the link flows are bounded. Also, uniqueness of an equilibrium link flow and
demand pattern solving variational inequality (22) is guaranteed under conditions of strict
monotonicity on the function that enters the variational inequality (cf. Nagurney (1999)).
We now present alternative variational inequalities to the one in (16) by utilizing the
expanded form (21). The alternative variational inequality in path flows, which includes
Lagrange multipliers, is defined over the nonnegative orthant, and we will utilize it for
computational purposes, since the algorithmic scheme that we propose for its solution, the
Euler method, will yield closed form expressions at each iteration for the variables, both the
path flows and the Lagrange multipliers.
Let λa; a ∈ Li; ∀i and ηa; a ∈ LS denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with
constraints (10) and (11), respectively.
Theorem 1: Alternative Variational Inequality Formulations of the Variational
Equilibrium in Path Flows and in Link Flows
The variational equilibrium (16) is equivalent to the variational inequality: determine the
vector of equilibrium path flows, and the vector of optimal Lagrange multipliers, (x∗, λ∗, η∗) ∈
K, such that:
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
∑
p∈P ik
∂Cˆip(x∗)
∂xip
+
∑
a∈Li
λ∗aδap +
∑
a∈LS
η∗aδap − ρˆik(x∗)−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xip
∑
q∈P il
xi∗q

×[xip − xi∗p ] +
I∑
i=1
∑
a∈Li
[
uia −
∑
p∈P
xi∗p δap
]
× [λa − λ∗a]
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+
∑
a∈LS
[
ua −
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P
xi∗p δap
]
× [ηa − η∗a] ≥ 0, (x, λ, η) ∈ K, (23)
where K ≡ {(x, λ, η)|x ∈ RnP+ , λ ∈ R
PI
i=1 nLi
+ , η ∈ RnLS+ }.
The variational inequality (23), in turn, can be rewritten in terms of link flows as: deter-
mine the vector of equilibrium link flows, the vector of demands, and the vector of optimal
Lagrange multipliers, (f ∗, d∗, λ∗, η∗) ∈ K1, such that:
I∑
i=1
∑
a∈Li
[∑
b∈Li
∂cˆib(f
∗)
∂f ia
+ λ∗a
]
× [f ia − f i∗a ] +
I∑
i=1
∑
a∈LS
[∑
b∈LS
∂cˆib(f
∗)
∂f ia
+ η∗a
]
× [f ia − f i∗a ]
+
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
[
−ρik(d∗)−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρil(d
∗)
∂dik
d∗il
]
× [dik − d∗ik]
+
I∑
i=1
∑
a∈Li
[
uia − f i∗a
]× [λa − λ∗a] + ∑
a∈LS
[
ua −
I∑
i=1
f i∗a
]
× [ηa − η∗a] ≥ 0, (f, d, λ, η) ∈ K1,
(24)
where K1 ≡ {(f, d, λ, η)|∃x ≥ 0, (1) and (3) hold, andλ ≥ 0, η ≥ 0}.
Proof: Variational inequality (23) follows from the Karush Kuhn Tucker conditions (see
also Lemma 1.2 in Yashtini and Malek (2007)). Variational inequality (24) then follows from
variational inequality (23) by making use of the conservation of flow equations. 2
It is interesting that the supply chain network oligopoly model with capacity competition
and outsourcing contains, as a special case, the supply chain network problem without
capacity competition for shared distribution centers and freight service providers, with the
supply chain network topology depicted in Figure 2. A spectrum of supply chain network
models, in which there are no coupling constraints, with similar topologies to the one in
Figure 2, have been formulated and studied in the literature (see, e.g., Nagurney (2010))
with applications including fashion (Nagurney, Yu, and Floden (2015)) and pharmaceuticals
with the use of generalized networks to capture product perishability (Masoumi, Yu, and
Nagurney (2012)) as well as sustainability (Nagurney, Yu, and Floden (2013)).
Of course, another special case of our model arises when the manufacturers/producers
don’t own any distribution centers and must outsource storage as well as freight service
provision with the underlying supply chain network topology then corresponding to the one
given in Figure 3.
14
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3. The Algorithm
The Euler method, which is induced by the general iterative scheme of Dupuis and Nagur-
ney (1993) is presented in this Section. Specifically, at an iteration τ of the Euler method
(see also Nagurney and Zhang (1996)) one computes:
Xτ+1 = PK(Xτ − aτF (Xτ )), (25)
where PK is the projection on the feasible set K and F is the utility function that enters the
variational inequality problem (16).
As shown in Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) and Nagurney and Zhang (1996), for conver-
gence of the general iterative scheme, which induces the Euler method, the sequence {aτ}
must satisfy:
∑∞
τ=0 aτ =∞, aτ > 0, aτ → 0, as τ →∞. Specific conditions for convergence
of this scheme as well as various applications to the solutions of network oligopolies can
be found in Nagurney and Zhang (1996), Nagurney, Dupuis, and Zhang (1994), Nagurney
(2010), Nagurney and Yu (2012), and Masoumi, Yu, and Nagurney (2012).
3.1 Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to the Alernative Variational
Inequality Formulation
The elegance of this procedure for the computation of solutions to the supply chain network
with capacity competition and outsourcing in Section 2 can be seen in the following explicit
formulae. The closed form expressions for the path flows at iteration τ + 1 are as follows.
For each path p ∈ P ik, ∀i, k, compute:
xi
τ+1
p = max{0, xi
τ
p + aτ (ρˆik(x
τ ) +
nR∑
l=1
∂ρˆil(x
τ )
∂xip
∑
q∈P il
xi
τ
q −
∂Cˆip(x
τ )
∂xip
−
∑
a∈Li
λτaδap −
∑
a∈LS
ητaδap)},
∀p ∈ P ik; i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR. (26)
The Lagrange multipliers for the individual firms’ link a ∈ Li; i = 1, . . . , I, can be computed
as:
λτ+1a = max{0, λτa + aτ (
∑
p∈P
xi
τ
p δap − uia)}, ∀a ∈ Li; i = 1, . . . , I. (27)
The computation process for the Lagrange multipliers for the shared link a ∈ LS, can be
given as:
ητ+1a = max{0, ητa + aτ (
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P
xi
τ
p δap − ua)}, ∀a ∈ LS. (28)
The number of strategic variables xp, as well as the number of the paths, in the supply
chain network, grow linearly in terms of the number of nodes in the supply chain network.
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Therefore, even a supply chain network with hundreds of demand markets is still tractable
within our proposed modeling and computational framework.
4. Case Study
In this section we present a case study in order to illustrate the modeling framework
and its relevance to applications. The case study consists of four examples inspired by a
food supply chain application in which the food is fresh produce, specifically, apples. The
case study is based on our experiences with apple growers in western Massachusetts. We
consider two farmers that grow the apples, which, because of their quality, are represented
by brands. Each farmer has two areas in which he grows his apples and each farm supplies
its produce to two major retailers in the form of supermarkets in western Massachusetts. In
the examples we vary the supply chain network topologies and describe additional details
below. The top-most links in the supply chain network topologies for the four examples
(see Figures 4 through 7) correspond to production links and these links also include the
harvesting, processing, and packaging costs. The unit of the flows in these supply chain
network examples is bushel(s) of apples.
The Euler method described in the preceding section was implemented in FORTRAN and
a Linux system at the University of Massachusetts Amherst was used for the implementation
and the computation of solutions below. The convergence tolerance  = 10−6; that is,
the Euler method was deemed to have converged if the absolute value of the difference
of the successive computed iterates of the variables differed by no more than this . We
initialized the Euler method by setting the demands for each firm’s brand at each demand
market to 100 and distributing the demand among the path flows equally for each set of
farm/demand market pairs. The Lagrange multipliers were all initialized to 0.00. The
sequence {aτ} = .1{1, 12 , 12 , 13 , 13 , 13 , . . .}.
The link definitions for all the supply chain network examples, along with the total
operational cost functions, are reported in Table 2. The link capacities and the demand
price functions are given subsequently.
The supply chain network with the full set of nodes and links is in Example 3, Figure 6.
The other examples in the case study have a subset of nodes and links to illustrate different
scenarios.
The cost functions are constructed according to the information gathered from Berkett
(1994) and CISA (2016). It is assumed that Farm 1 has 200 acres and Farm 2 has 100
acres of land. Therefore, the labor and machinery costs of Farm 1 are expected to be higher
17
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Table 2: Definition of Links and Associated Total Operational Cost Functions for the Nu-
merical Examples
Link a From Node To Node cˆ1a(f
1
a ) cˆ
2
a(f
2
a )
1 1 M11 0.03(f
1
1 )
2
+ 3f 11 –
2 1 M12 0.02(f
1
2 )
2
+ 2f 12 –
3 M11 D
1
1,1 0.01(f
1
3 )
2
+ 4f 13 –
4 M12 D
1
1,1 0.025(f
1
4 )
2
+ 3f 14 –
5 D11,1 D
1
1,2 0.035(f
1
5 )
2
+ 5f 15 –
6 D11,2 R1 0.02(f
1
6 )
2
+ 2f 16 –
7 D11,2 R2 0.03(f
1
7 )
2
+ 5f 17 –
8 2 M21 – 0.01(f
2
8 )
2
+ 6f 28
9 2 M22 – 0.01(f
2
9 )
2
+ 6f 29
10 M21 D
2
1,1 – 0.02(f
2
10)
2
+ 4f 210
11 M22 D
2
1,1 – 0.02(f
2
11)
2
+ 4f 211
12 D21,1 D
2
1,2 – 0.03(f
2
12)
2
+ 5f 212
13 D21,2 R1 – 0.02(f
2
13)
2
+ 8f 213
14 D21,2 R2 – 0.035(f
2
14)
2
+ 5f 214
15 M11 OD1,1 0.01(f
1
15)
2
+ 6f 115 –
16 M12 OD1,1 0.02(f
1
16)
2
+ 5f 116 –
17 M21 OD1,1 – 0.02(f
2
17)
2
+ 5f 217
18 M22 OD1,1 – 0.02(f
2
18)
2
+ 6f 218
19 OD1,1 OD1,2 0.01(f
1
19)
2
+ f 119 0.01(f
2
19)
2
+ f 219
20 OD1,2 R1 0.012(f
1
20)
2
+ 2f 120 0.012(f
2
20)
2
+ 2f 220
21 OD1,2 R2 0.01(f
1
21)
2
+ f 121 0.01(f
2
21)
2
+ f 221
(see cost functions for links 1 and 2) than they are for Farm 2 (refer to total link costs for
links 8 and 9). The second production facility of Farm 1, M12 , is assumed to be smaller in
land size than its first production facility, M11 . Therefore, the total cost function on link 2
is smaller than the total cost function on link 1. On the other hand, Farm 2 has identical
production facilities, M21 and M
2
2 , which results in the total cost functions on links 8 and 9
being the same. Both of the farms have controlled atmospheric storage and similar costs of
storage. Furthermore, Farm 1 owns more vehicles, machinery, and employees to transport
and distribute the processed apples to the storage units and to the retailers. This means that
the transportation and distribution costs of Farm 1 are lower than Farm 2’s. The external
distribution center has the lowest storage cost due to its size of storage and its business
capability. Also, the cost of distributing the apples from the external distribution center
(which, in effect, can serve as a wholesaler) to the supermarkets is relatively low, due to
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its location, market power, and the size of its freight fleet. Observe from Table 2 that the
external distribution center charges both farmers the same price, in effect, for storage and
distribution, as reflected in the total costs, since the two supermarkets are in proximity to
one another. Indeed, these functions depend on the volume of each of the farmers’ apples
that the external distribution center handles in terms of storage and distribution to the
supermarkets. Additionally, the time horizon for the case study examples or the supply
chain activities is taken as 3-4 weeks, which corresponds to the total harvest time of apples.
Also, the link capacities, in bushels of apples, are as follows:
For Farm 1:
u11 = 3000, u
1
2 = 1000, u
1
3 = 2000, u
1
4 = 1000, u
1
5 = 10000,
u16 = 500, u
1
7 = 300, u
1
15 = 2000, u
1
16 = 500.
For Farm 2:
u28 = 1500, u
2
9 = 500, u
2
10 = 1000, u
2
11 = 500, u
2
12 = 5000,
u213 = 400, u
2
14 = 200, u
2
17 = 1500, u
2
18 = 400.
For the External Distribution Center and Freight Service Provider:
u19 = 10000, u20 = 1000, u21 = 1000.
The capacities on the links associated with the farms are constructed based on size of
land, the available manpower, machinery, and vehicles. In general, since Farm 1 is larger
in size, in terms of the number of employees and machinery than Farm 2, the capacities
on its links are larger. However, the storage and transportation capacities of the external
distribution center or the wholesaler, as expected, are as high or higher than those associated
with the individual farms.
The demand price functions for the apples from Farm 1 and Farm 2 are as follows:
Farm 1:
ρ11(d) = −0.002d11 − 0.001d21 + 90,
ρ12(d) = −0.003d12 − 0.001d22 + 100,
Farm 2:
ρ21(d) = −0.002d21 − 0.001d11 + 80,
19
ρ22(d) = −0.0025d22 − 0.001d12 + 100.
Consumers ate the second supermarket are willing to pay a higher price for each brand
of apples.
Example 1: Only Farmers’ Storage Facilities Are Available
In Example 1, each farmer has a storage facility / distribution center for his apples. The
supply chain network topology is depicted in Figure 4. In this example there are no available
external distribution centers. This example serves as a baseline.
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Figure 4: Example 1 Supply Chain Network Topology
The computed equilibrium link flow and Lagrange multiplier patterns are given in Table
3. Note that, because of the supply chain network topology in Figure 4, the only vector of
equilibrium Lagrange multipliers is λ∗ since there are no external distribution centers.
Observe from Table 3 that link 14 is at its capacity and, hence, the associated Lagrange
multiplier is positive.
Also, for completeness, we report the computed equilibrium path flows.
The eight paths are defined as follows:
p1 = (1, 3, 5, 6), p2 = (2, 4, 5, 6), p3 = (1, 3, 5, 7), p4 = (2, 4, 5, 7),
p5 = (8, 10, 12, 13), p6 = (9, 11, 12, 13), p7 = (8, 10, 12, 14), p8 = (9, 11, 12, 14)
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Table 3: Equilibrium Link Flow and Lagrange Multiplier Pattern for Example 1
Link a f 1∗a f
2∗
a λ
∗
a
1 291.33 – 0.00
2 281.54 – 0.00
3 291.33 – 0.00
4 281.54 – 0.00
5 572.86 – 0.00
6 279.24 – 0.00
7 293.62 – 0.00
8 – 244.48 0.00
9 – 244.48 0.00
10 – 244.48 0.00
11 – 244.48 0.00
12 – 488.96 0.00
13 – 288.96 0.00
14 – 200.00 19.68
and the equilibrium product path flows are:
x1∗p1 = 142.07, x
1∗
p2
= 137.17, x1∗p3 = 149.26, x
1∗
p4
= 144.37,
x2∗p5 = 144.48, x
2∗
p6
= 144.48, x2∗p7 = 100.00, x
2∗
p8
= 100.00.
The incurred equilibrium prices at the demand markets are: ρ11 = 89.15, ρ12 = 98.92,
ρ21 = 79.14, and ρ22 = 98.71. These prices are reasonable, since, typically, a bushel of apples
in western Massachusetts commands a price of approximately $80.
The incurred equilibrium demands, in turn, are as follows: d∗11 = 279.24, d
∗
12 = 293.62,
d∗21 = 288.96, and d
∗
22 = 200.00. The profit of Farm 1 is 23,008.39 and that of Farm 2 is
18,135.58. Farm 1 attains a higher profit than Farm 2, since it sells its apples at a higher
price at demand market, R1. In addition, Farm 1 sells more than Farm 2 at the second
demand market, R2, even though the price of their apples are the same. This result is due,
in part, to the capacity constraint of Farm 2 which also causes low profits for Farm 2.
Example 2: An External Distribution Center Is Made Available But Only Farmer
2 Is Considering It
In Example 2, an external distribution center has become available but only the second
farmer is interested in considering it. The supply chain network topology is given in Figure
5.
21
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Figure 5: Example 2 Supply Chain Network Topology
Please refer to Table 2 for the complete data for Example 2.
The computed equilibrium link flow pattern and the Lagrange multiplier patterns are
reported in Table 4. Recall that the Lagrange multipliers λ correspond to the firms’ links
that they have complete control over, whereas the Lagrange multipliers η correspond to the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the links of the external distribution center, that is,
links 19, 20, and 21 in Figure 5.
In addition to the previous eight paths defined for Example 1, there are now four addi-
tional paths as follows:
p9 = (8, 17, 19, 20), p10 = (9, 18, 19, 20), p11 = (8, 17, 19, 21), p12 = (9, 18, 19, 21).
The computed equilibrium product path flows for Example 2 are:
x1∗p1 = 144.37, x
1∗
p2
= 139.35, x1∗p3 = 145.76, x
1∗
p4
= 140.77, x2∗p5 = 119.98, x
2∗
p6
= 39.94,
x2∗p7 = 139.93, x
2∗
p8
= 60.07, x2∗p9 = 134.86, x
2∗
p10
= 40.23, x2∗p11 = 452.95, x
2∗
p12
= 359.76.
The incurred equilibrium prices at the demand markets are: ρ11 = 89.10, ρ12 = 98.13,
ρ21 = 79.05, and ρ22 = 94.65. The incurred equilibrium demands, in turn, are as follows:
d∗11 = 283.73, d
∗
12 = 286.53, d
∗
21 = 335.01, and d
∗
22 = 1012.71. The profit of Farm 1 is
22,760.00 and that of Farm 2 is 57,363.86. Observe that, in this example, Farm 2’s profit
dramatically increases from its value in Example 1; in fact, it more than triples. Since Farm
22
Table 4: Equilibrium Link Flow and Lagrange Multiplier Patterns for Example 2
Link a f 1∗a f
2∗
a λ
∗
a η
∗
a
1 290.13 – 0.00 –
2 280.12 – 0.00 –
3 290.13 – 0.00 –
4 280.12 – 0.00 –
5 570.25 – 0.00 –
6 283.73 – 0.00 –
7 286.53 – 0.00 –
8 – 847.72 0.00 –
9 – 500.00 13.40 –
10 – 259.91 0.00 –
11 – 100.01 0.00 –
12 – 359.92 0.00 –
13 – 159.92 0.00 –
14 – 200.00 6.58 –
17 – 587.81 0.00 –
18 – 400.00 0.03 –
19 – 987.81 – 0.00
20 – 175.09 – 0.00
21 – 812.71 – 0.00
2 uses the external distribution center and its large storage facilities, the capacity limitations
experienced in Example 1 for Farm 2 are eliminated. Now Farm 2 sells more of its apples
at both demand markets and attains a higher profit. This result can also be seen from
the fact that the optimal Lagrange multipliers on links 9, 14, and 18 are positive. Recall
that link 14 corresponds to distribution from the second farmer’s own distribution center
to the second supermarket, whereas link 18 corresponds to the farm’s transportation to the
external distribution center. This means that Farm 2 transports its apples to the external
distribution center and to the second supermarket at full capacity. Furthermore, a decrease
in the price of Farm 2’s apples at the second demand market, R2, can be explained by the
demand increase in this market.
Farm 2, by availing itself of the new service provided by the external distribution center,
clearly gains economically, whereas Farm 1 experiences a decrease in profits as compared to
its profit in Example 1.
23
Example 3: Both Farmers Are Considering the External Distribution Center
In Example 3, both farmers now are considering the option of the external distribution center
and also still have available their own distribution centers, that is, storage facilities. The
supply chain network topology for this example is depicted in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Example 3 Supply Chain Network Topology
The computed equilibrium link flow and Lagrange multiplier patterns are reported in
Table 5.
The additional four paths to those in Example 2 for Example 3 are:
p13 = (1, 15, 19, 20), p14 = (2, 16, 19, 20), p15 = (1, 15, 19, 21), p16 = (2, 16, 19, 21).
The computed equilibrium path flows are:
x1∗p1 = 62.86, x
1∗
p2
= 114.71, x1∗p3 = 79.47, x
1∗
p4
= 130.33, x2∗p5 = 115.78, x
2∗
p6
= 52.36,
x2∗p7 = 131.66, x
2∗
p8
= 68.34, x2∗p9 = 211.69, x
2∗
p10
= 135.28, x2∗p11 = 318.89, x
2∗
p12
= 244.01.
x1∗p13 = 238.13, x
1∗
p14
= 242.8, x1∗p15 = 216.12, x
1∗
p16
= 220.88.
The incurred equilibrium prices at the demand markets are: ρ11 = 88.17, ρ12 = 97.30,
ρ21 = 78.31, and ρ22 = 95.54. The incurred equilibrium demands, in turn, are as follows:
d∗11 = 658.56, d
∗
12 = 646.89, d
∗
21 = 515.12, and d
∗
22 = 762.91. The profit of Farm 1 is 56,673.31
and that of Farm 2 is 42,412.05.
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Table 5: Equilibrium Link Flow and Lagrange Multiplier Patterns for Example 3
Link a f 1∗a f
2∗
a λ
∗
a η
∗
a
1 596.67 – 0.00 –
2 708.78 – 0.00 –
3 142.33 – 0.00 –
4 245.04 – 0.00 –
5 387.37 – 0.00 –
6 177.57 – 0.00 –
7 209.80 – 0.00 –
8 – 778.03 0.00 –
9 – 500.00 10.63 –
10 – 247.45 0.00
11 – 120.70 0.00
12 – 368.15 0.00
13 – 168.14 0.00
14 – 200.00 10.20 –
15 454.34 – 0.00 –
16 463.74 – 0.00 –
17 – 530.58 0.00 –
18 – 379.29 0.00 –
19 918.08 909.88 – 0.00
20 480.99 346.97 – 0.00
21 437.10 562.91 – 12.41
With increased services and competition for them, Farm 2 experiences a drop in profits,
as compared to those obtained in Example 2. Farm 1, on the other hand, more than doubles
its profits by taking advantage of the services provided by the external distribution center.
Interestingly, the capacity on link 21 is reached, with an associated positive Lagrange
multiplier associated with that shared distribution link from the external distribution center.
Also, again, the capacity on link 9 associated with Farm 2’s second production facility is
also attained. Clearly, Farm 2 should try to purchase more land in proximity to that facility
since it is constraining its apple production capabilities and demand for its brand of apples.
Example 4: A Supply Chain Disruption Has Damaged Farmers’ Distribution
Centers
Example 4 considers a supply chain disruption. Both farmers have their storage facilities
made unavailable due to a natural disaster, such as flooding. However, their produce has not
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been affected and still is being picked. Apples have to be kept at an appropriate temperature
under refrigeration for quality retention. The external distribution center is, nevertheless,
available to them. The supply chain network topology for this example is given in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Example 4 Supply Chain Network Topology
The computed equilibrium link flow and Lagrange multiplier patterns are reported in
Table 6.
Table 6: Equilibrium Link Flow and Lagrange Multiplier Patterns for Example 4
Link a From Node To Node f 1∗a f
2∗
a λ
∗
a η
∗
a
1 1 M11 513.45 – 0.00 –
2 1 M12 500.00 – 0.00 –
8 2 M21 – 574.26 0.00 –
9 2 M22 – 400.00 0.00 –
15 M11 OD1,1 513.45 – 0.00 –
16 M12 OD1,1 500.00 – 3.07 –
17 M21 OD1,1 – 574.26 0.00 –
18 M22 OD1,1 – 400.00 9.38 –
19 OD1,1 OD1,2 1013.45 974.26 – 0.00
20 OD1,2 R1 576.09 411.62 – 0.00
21 OD1,2 R2 437.36 562.64 – 15.75
The computed equilibrium path flow for Example 4 is:
x1∗p13 = 291.20, x
1∗
p14
= 284.90, x1∗p15 = 225.25, x
1∗
p15
= 222.25, x1∗p16 = 215.10,
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x2∗p9 = 249.52, x
2∗
p10
= 162.10, x2∗p11 = 324.75, x
2∗
p12
= 237.90.
The incurred equilibrium prices at the demand markets are: ρ11 = 88.44, ρ12 = 98.13,
ρ21 = 78.60, and ρ22 = 96.75. The incurred equilibrium demands, in turn, are as follows:
d∗11 = 576.09, d
∗
12 = 437.36, d
∗
21 = 411.62, and d
∗
22 = 562.64. The profit of Farm 1 is
46,427.75 and that of Farm 2 is 29,237.16. Following the supply chain disruption, which
damages both farms’ storage facilities, in that the capacities, are, in effect equal to zero on
the corresponding links, both farmers suffer a decrease in profits.
As Table 6 reveals that link 16, associated with Farm 1, and link 18, associated with
Farm 2, both of which are transportation links, are at their capacities and the associated
Lagrange multipliers are positive. Also, the common, that is, shared, link 21, is also at its
capacity with the Lagrange multiplier associated with this link being positive.
In Table 7, the profits of each farm for every example in the case study are summarized.
Table 7: Farm Profits for the Examples
Example Farm 1 Profit Farm 2 Profit
1 23,008.39 18,135.58
2 22,760.00 57,363.86
3 56,673.31 42,412.05
4 46,427.75 29,237.16
Clearly, both farms benefit, in terms of profits, by utilizing the external distribution center
as revealed by the profit increases from Example 1 to Example 3. Furthermore, if, given a
choice of operating their own distribution centers or using an external distribution center
exclusively, a comparison of farm profits for Example 1, vis a vis the profits for Example 2,
reveals that the latter is preferable.
The above results support what is happening increasingly in practice. First of all, Berkett
(1994) states that farmers can harvest 600 bushels of apples per acre with a profit of approx-
imately $2200. In our case study, we assume that Farm 1 has 200 acres and Farm 2 has 100
acres of land. If the information gathered from Berkett (1994) is taken as an upper bound on
profit and the path flows, then we can claim that our results on profit and flows are feasible
and consistent with reality. Furthermore, according to a survey conducted by North Car-
olina State University (see Dunning (2014)), farms mostly use wholesalers as their primary
marketing channel. Selling to a wholesaler can be more advantageous, especially for the
small and middle-sized farms. For example, wholesalers can, typically, transport, store, and
27
distribute higher volumes of fresh produce than the farmers can (Miles and Brown (2005)).
Furthermore, since wholesalers maintain the relationships with the retailers, farms do not
have to deal with the end customer directly; therefore, they can focus on the production
side.
5. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a supply chain network framework using game theory in which
multiple manufacturers/producers have their own production facilities, distribution centers,
and also distribute their products, which are distinguished by the firms’ brands, to multiple
demand points, which can correspond to retailers. In addition, they can outsource their
product storage to external distribution centers who also provide freight service provision to
the demand points. The firms have capacities associated with their supply chain network
links, consisting of production, transportation, storage, and distribution, and compete also
for the external distribution centers’ services, which are also capacitated, but those links
are shared, that is, common to the interested manufacturers. We assume noncooperative
behavior with the manufacturers seeking to maximize their individual profits.
Due to the shared constraints, the governing equilibrium can no longer be directly for-
mulated as a variational inequality problem. However, we utilize the concept of variational
equilibrium, which is a special case of a Generalized Nash Equilibrium, with nice economic
interpretations in that the Lagrange multipliers associated with the shared constraints are
the same for the manufacturers. This problem is then analyzed qualitatively with existence
guaranteed. Moreover, we propose an effective computational scheme, which resolves the
problem into closed form expressions, at each iteration, for the product path flows and the
Lagrange multipliers, until convergence is achieved.
We then illustrate the novel supply chain game theory framework with a case study
consisting of producers that are apple farmers. Our case study reveals the benefits of external
distribution centers and freight service provision in this sector.
The contributions in this paper add to the literature on supply chain network competition
in terms of modeling advances with appropriate methodological foundations for a level of
greater realism and generality for practice.
As for future research, the inclusion of stochastic elements would be worthwhile as well as
the incorporation and investigation of competition for shared manufacturing plant resources,
as occurs often in the high tech sector in the case of outsourcing of production. Finally, the
exploration of alternative computational procedures based on global optimization techniques
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may also hold promise, along with the introduction of economies of scale in the Generalized
Nash Equilibrium supply chain network model.
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